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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 28 JUNE 1976 NUMBER 2
EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMINAL ACTS IN
SOUTH CAROLINA
WALTER A. REISER, JR.*
Every lawyer is familiar with the basic requirement for the
admissibility of evidence: evidence is not admissible unless it is
relevant to one of the issues in the litigation. The test for relev-
ance is whether or not the evidence offered "tends to establish,
or to make more or less probable, some matter in issue . . .-
However, relevant evidence may be excluded if its effect unduly
prejudices the feelings of the jury for or against one of the parties
because of the introduction of a matter that is not at issue in the
case on trial. When proffered evidence is objected to as being
unduly prejudicial, "its relevancy, i.e. its tendency to prove an
issue in dispute, must be weighed against [its] tendency . . . to
produce passion and prejudice out of proportion to its probative
value."2
The necessity for weighing or balancing relevance against
prejudice frequently arises in criminal trials where the State of-
fers evidence which tends to prove some essential element of its
case, but which also prejudices the defendant by showing that he
has committed a crime or bad act other than the one for which
he is on trial. For example, a defendant is on trial for armed
robbery of a service station at 1 a.m. on the night of January 1,
and the State introduces the testimony of a witness who testifies
that he saw the defendant at 12:30 a.m. on the same date rob an
all-night grocery store two blocks from the service station. This
testimony is relevant to the State's case insofar as it shows that
the defendant was in the vicinity of the service station and armed
with a pistol at the time the service station was robbed. However,
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law; B.S., Georgia Insti-
tute of Technology, 1943; LL.B., University of South Carolina, 1955; LL.M., Harvard
University, 1967.
1. Francis v. Mauldin, 215 S.C. 374, 378, 55 S.E.2d 337, 338 (1949).
2. State v. Flett, 234 Ore. 124, 127, 380 P.2d 634, 636 (1963).
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this testimony is prejudicial to the defendant because it induces
the jury to think that the defendant should be punished because
he is a bad man who goes around robbing people, whether or not
he actually committed the service station robbery. The South
Carolina Supreme Court, Justice Marion delivering the opinion
of the Court, addressed this issue in State v. Lyle:'
Proof that a defendant has been guilty of another crime equally
heinous prompts to a ready acceptance of and belief in the pros-
ecution's theory that he is guilty of the crime charged. Its effect
is to predispose the mind of the juror to believe the prisoner
guilty, and thus effectually to strip him of the presumption of
innocence. It 'compels the defendant to meet charges of which
the indictment gives him no information, confuses him in his
defense, raises a variety of issues, and thus diverts the attention
of the jury from the one immediately before it.'"
A balance between relevance and undue prejudice must be
struck, but what guidelines or standards should the court use in
reaching such a balance? In Lyle the supreme court adopted the
rule that such evidence is admissible where it is relevant to any
one of five issues:
'Generally speaking, evidence of other crimes is competent to
prove the specific crime charged when it tends to establish (1)
motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a
common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or
more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to
establish the others; (5) the identity of the person charged with
the commission of the crime on trial.'
5
Since Lyle the supreme court has applied this rule strictly, test-
ing the evidence in each case on the basis of whether or not it is
relevant to any one of the enumerated exceptions. A careful read-
ing of the Lyle opinion, however, suggests that a degree of rele-
vance greater than mere relevance must be shown for such evi-
dence to be admissible. In Lyle, Justice Marion wrote:
Whether evidence of other distinct crimes properly falls within
any of the recognized exceptions noted is often a difficult matter
to determine. The acid test is its logical relevancy to the particu-
lar excepted purpose or purposes for which it is sought to be
3. 125 SC. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923).
4. Id. at 416, 118 S.E. at 807 (citation omitted).
5. Id., quoting People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 293, 61 N.E. 286, 294 (1901).
[Vol. 28
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introduced. If it is logically pertinent in that it reasonably tends
to prove a material fact in issue, it is not to be rejected merely
because it incidentally proves the defendant guilty of another
crime. But the dangerous tendency and misleading probative
force of this class of evidence require that its admission should
be subjected by the Courts to rigid scrutiny. Whether the requi-
site degree of relevance exists is a judicial question to be re-
solved in the light of the consideration that the inevitable tend-
ency of such evidence is to raise a legally spurious presumption
of guilt in the minds of the jurors. Hence, if the Court does not
clearly perceive the connection between the extraneous criminal
transaction and the crime charged, that is, its logical relevancy,
the accused should be given the benefit of the doubt, and the
evidence should be rejected.'
The "legally spurious presumption of guilt" that Justice
Marion refers to is actually an inference rather than a presump-
tion.7 Thus, when a juror hears evidence that the defendant has
committed some other criminal act, he is likely to infer that the
defendant's character is criminal; the juror is then likely to infer,
from the fact that the defendant is a criminal, that he committed
the crime for which he is now on trial. Several South Carolina
cases have recognized the danger that evidence of crimes uncon-
nected with the crime on trial may unduly prejudice the rights
of a defendant. These cases have held that "the State cannot in
any way attack the character of a defendant in a criminal prose-
cution unless that issue is first tendered by him,"8 and they have
specifically held that his character cannot be attacked by evi-
dence of other criminal acts committed by the defendant? It is
clear from Lyle and the later cases that where the juror can infer
the defendant's guilt only by way of an intermediate inference of
the defendant's character drawn from evidence of another crimi-
nal act, the evidence is not admissible.
Lyle, nevertheless, is precedent for the proposition that evi-
dence of other crimes is admissible if it can reasonably lead to an
inference of guilt by a chain of logic that does not include an
inference link concerning the character of the defendant. It fur-
ther stands for the proposition that this independent, non-
6. 125 S.C. at 416-17, 118 S.E. at 807 (emphasis added).
7. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2490 (3d ed. Supp. 1975).
8. State v. Gamble, 247 S.C. 214, 223, 146 S.E.2d 709, 714 (1966).
9. State v. Britt, 235 S.C. 395, 111 S.E.2d 669 (1959); State v. Anderson, 181 S.C.
527, 188 S.E. 186 (1936); State v. Bigham, 133 S.C. 491, 131 S.E. 603 (1926).
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character inference chain must be "clearly perceive[d]" by the
court in order for the evidence to be properly received against the
defendant.
This article will seek to determine whether or not the Su-
preme Court of South Carolina has, in deciding appeals involving
the admissibility of evidence of other criminal acts, adequately
considered the requirement imposed by Lyle - that the court
must "clearly perceive the connection between the extraneous
criminal transaction and the crime charged."'" Six such cases will
be examined and discussed.
1. State v. Lyle"
The defendant was on trial for uttering a forged check upon
The Farmers & Merchants Bank of Aiken, S.C., on January 12,
1922. The State first offered the testimony of a Farmers & Mer-
chants Bank employee, who testified that the defendant Lyle had
committed the forgery and had presented the check in the pres-
ence of the witness. This testimony was admitted into evidence
without objection. The State then offered testimony of two em-
ployees of banks other than Farmers & Merchants to the effect
that the defendant Lyle had on the same date as the date of the
crime for which he was on trial passed forged checks in both of
their banks in the city of Aiken. That testimony was admitted
over the defendant's objection. The State then offered the testi-
mony of bankers from three different towns in Georgia, each of
whom was prepared to testify that the defendant Lyle had on a
specific date, from one to six weeks prior to the date of the crime
for which defendant was on trial, forged a check at the witness'
bank. That testimony was also admitted over the defendant's
objection.
Under the rule spelled out by Justice Marion,'" the court
must find a clear perception of the relevance of the offered testi-
mony. Most people, experienced in the management of their busi-
ness or personal affairs, would have little difficulty perceiving the
relevance of this evidence. They would find that the forgery on
occasion A clearly makes it probable that the actor committed
the charged forgery committed on occasion B. In moving from
occasion A to occasion B the chain of inferences is as follows:
10. 125 S.C. at 417, 118 S.E. at 807.
11. 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923).
12.. Id. at 417, 118 S.E. at 807; see text accompanying note 6 supra.
[Vol. 28
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(1) The defendant committed a forgery on occasion A.
(2) The defendant is a forger.
(3) The defendant committed the forgery on occasion B.
Link (2) in this chain of inferences is an inference of the character
of the defendant, and such an inference is prohibited. When link
(2) is removed, there is no longer a connection between link (1)
and link (3), and the evidence of the forgery committed on occa-
sion A is irrelevant.
But perhaps relevance can be found through a chain of infer-
ences that does not depend upon the character link. In Lyle the
evidence showed that the defendant committed another forgery
on the same day and in the same town in which the charged crime
was committed. The following inference chain suggests that the
defendant is guilty without resorting to the character link:
(1) Defendant committed a forgery at the Bank of Western
Carolina in Aiken, S.C., between 10 a.m. and 12 noon on Janu-
ary 12, 1922.
(2) Defendant was physically present in the business section
of Aiken between 10 a.m. and 12 noon on January 12, 1922, near
the Farmers & Merchants Bank.
(3) Since the defendant was in the vicinity of the Farmers &
Merchants Bank at the time when a forgery was committed
there, he is more likely to have committed that forgery than is
someone of whose whereabouts at the time we know nothing.
(4) Defendant is the person who committed the forgery at the
Farmers & Merchants Bank.
This inference chain was approved by Justice Marion, writ-
ing for the supreme court, on the ground that the evidence tended
to establish the identity of the forger.'3 However, can we say that
the court could "clearly perceive" the connection between link (1)
and link (4) of the inference chain? "When an act is done, and a
particular person is alleged to have done it (not through an agent
but personally), it is obvious that his physical presence, within a
proper range of time and place, forms one step on the way to the
belief that he did it."" In other words, evidence of the defendant's
presence near the bank at a certain time is relevant to the issue
on trial. But evidence of what he was doing at that time seems
irrelevant; that portion of the other banker's evidence makes no
13. 125 S.C. at 417-18, 118 S.E. at 808.
14. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 131 (3d ed. 1940).
1976]
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contribution to the inference chain set out above. There is signifi-
cant likelihood, as Justice Marion notes, that the jury is prone to
use the character chain whenever it learns that the defendant has
committed some other act that reflects on his character. The rule,
as it was applied in Lyle, allowed the full evidence of the other
act to be admitted even though only a portion of that evidence,
Lyle's presence at the other bank, was clearly relevant to the
issues then on trial. It therefore seems that the supreme court in
Lyle misapplied the rule it was laying down by approving the
admission of evidence that could not be clearly perceived as rele-
vant to the issues then on trial.'5
In Lyle the court held that evidence that defendant had com-
mitted other forgeries of a similar nature in other places in Geor-
gia was improperly admitted by the trial court.'" In considering
the admissibility of this evidence the court tested the following
inference chain:
(1) Lyle, the defendant, committed in Athens, Ga., on Decem-
ber 30, 1921, a forgery involving a check stolen from a cotton
merchant.
(la) The crime in question involved the forgery of a check
stolen from a cotton merchant.
(2) Lyle is more likely to have committed this crime than is
one about whom we know nothing.
(3) Lyle committed the crime in question.'7
In its analysis of this inference chain, the court said:
The mere fact that the Georgia crimes were similar in nature
and parallel as to methods and techniques employed in their
execution does not serve to identify the defendant as the person
who uttered the forged check in Aiken as charged, unless his
guilt of the latter crime may be inferred from its similarity to
the former . . . . To warrant such inference the similarity must
have established such a connection between the crimes as would
logically exclude or tend to exclude the possibility that the
Aiken crime could have been committed by another person
. . . . There is nothing to indicate that the defendant held any
monopoly of the methods and means used in passing the forged
checks in Georgia, or that they were unique in the annals of
crime. That the Aiken crime could have been committed by one
15. See generally State v. Daniels, 252 S.C. 591. 167 S.E.2d 621 (1969).
16. 125 S.C. at 430, 118 S.E. at 812.
17. Id. at 419-20, 118 S.E. at 808.
[Vol. 28
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of innumerable other persons using like means and methods is
obvious.' 8
It is interesting to note that the court, in considering evi-
dence of the Georgia crimes, in effect stated that such evidence
should not be used unless it and the inferences drawn from it
would make it appear virtually certain that the defendant com-
mitted the crime charged.'9 This is a much more severe standard
for admission than is the clear perception test that the court
declared as the rule. Even under the clear perception test this
inference chain would probably break at the drawing of inference
(2), because, as the court observed, "many similar crimes [have]
been committed by others in practically the same manner and by
the same methods.""0 This is equivalent to saying that there are
so many different individuals about whom statement (1) could be
made that the likelihood of inference (2) being true is below the
minimum level required.
2. State v. Gregory
2'
The defendant, secretary and treasurer of a municipal public
works department, was on trial for the felonious embezzlement of
$5,534.42 of public funds through checks and vouchers that had
been issued in payment of bills. At trial the State was permitted,
over defendant's objection, to introduce evidence that with the
knowledge and consent of the defendant a "by-pass" had been
installed around the water meter at defendant's residence and
had been maintained there for several years. The "by-pass" was
a device that permitted about three-fourths of the water that
would ordinarily pass through and register on the meter to pass
around it, thus reducing the defendant's water bill to about one-
fourth of what it should have been. The use of such a device "with
intention to cheat and defraud" the water works was a statutory
misdemeanor.
The inference chain immediately suggested is:
(1) The defendant stole water from the water works.
(2) The defendant is a thief.
(3) The defendant embezzled funds from the water works
through checks and vouchers.
18. Id. at 420-21, 118 S.E. at 808 (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 420, 118 S.E. at 808.
20. Id. at 421, 118 S.E. at 808.
21. 191 S.C. 212, 4 S.E.2d 1 (1939).
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This inference chain is prohibited by the rule against attack-
ing the character of a defendant, link (2) being a character link.
There appears to be no way in which an inference chain can be
built that would connect the use of the "by-pass" with the alleged
embezzlement of funds without using a character link. Therefore,
the evidence of the use of the "by-pass" was admitted erro-
neously. The supreme court came to the same conclusion, but by
a different argument."
3. State v. Pittman2
The defendant Alex Pittman and his son Holland Pittman
were indicted, tried, and convicted for the murder of J. H. How-
ard, a state constable who was shot and killed while raiding a
still. Two men had run from the still immediately after the shoot-
ing occurred but one, Holland Pittman, was captured. The State
contended that Alex Pittman was the second man who had run
from the still and that he had fired the fatal shots.
The State presented a great deal of circumstantial evidence,
which included testimony that (a) Alex Pittman had for years
been engaged in running distilleries, (b) his manner of operating
distilleries was peculiar or distinctive, and (c) the deceased, J. H.
Howard, had in the past interfered with Pittman's illicit liquor
operations. The defense objected to this testimony, arguing it was
evidence of other offenses not connected with the crime on trial
and was therefore irrelevant, and further that the evidence preju-
diced Pittman because it tended to show him to be a criminal.
The trial court admitted the evidence, and the supreme court
affirmed, holding the evidence to be properly admitted because
it was relevant to motive and identity.
To reach this conclusion, however, it is necessary to choose
22. The court reasoned that
it is the theory of [the State] that evidence of the commission by [the defen-
dantl of a misdemeanor is evidence that [the defendant intended to commit
a felony . . . . But even conceding that evidence that [the defendant] had
defrauded the Commissioners out of water would be some evidence that
Idefendant's] intent when he appropriated money belonging to the Commis-
sioners was fraudulent (granting that he did appropriate such money), yet it is
not [defendant'sl defense that he didn't intend to cheat and defraud the Com-
missioners. His defense is that he didn't take the money; that he hasn't appro-
priated one cent. This being so, 'the inevitable tendency of such evidence is
(was) to raise a legally spurious presumption of guilt in the minds of the jurors.'
Id. at 222-23, 4 S.E.2d at 5.
23. 137 S.C. 75, 134 S.E. 514 (1926).
[Vol. 28
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol28/iss2/2
EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMINAL AcTs
carefully the elements upon which the inference chains are based.
For example, the relevance of Pittman's past activities as a dis-
tiller may be established by the following inference chain:
(1) Alex Pittman had for years been engaged in running distil-
leries.
(2) Pittman was a distiller.
(3) Pittman was proprietor of the still at which Howard was
killed.
(4) Pittman was present at the still when Howard was killed.
(5) Pittman killed Howard.
Is link (2) a statement of character, or is it simply a state-
ment of Pittman's trade or profession? A statement that a person
is a thief is clearly a statement of his character, but a statement
that he is a shoe repairman is a statement of his trade. The trade
of distilling, in the circumstances of this case, was an illegal trade
and probably carried with it some implications of violent lawless-
ness. Therefore, the fact of Pittman's being a distiller would tend
to cause the jurors to think of him 'as a lawless person likely to
commit a murder. Link (2) would thus appear to be a character
link; when that link is removed, the chain breaks.
If the evidence of Pittman's past activities is combined with
the evidence of Howard's past interference, the following infer-
ence chain is established:
(1) Alex Pittman had for years been engaged in running distil-
leries, and the deceased J. H. Howard had in the past interfered
with Pittman's illicit liquor operations.
(2) Pittman held a grudge against Howard because of How-
ard's interference with Pittman's enterprises.
(3) Pittman wanted to retaliate against Howard.
(4) Pittman killed Howard.
This chain is probably a sound one unless link (2) is a charac-
ter link, the holding of a grudge perhaps being a character trait.
However, prior conduct of the deceased in opposing or injuring
the defendant is generally recognized to be admissible to show
motive for the commission of murder.24 Probably the characteris-
tic of holding grudges generally is a character trait, while the
holding of a grudge against one person or a small number of
persons does not rise to that level.
24. 2 J. WICMORE, EVIDENCE § 390 (3d ed. 1940).
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The relevance of evidence establishing Pittman's distinctive
manner as a distillery operator to prove identity is arguably es-
tablished by the following chain of inferences:
(1) Pittman's manner of operating his distilleries was peculiar
or distinctive (and the distillery at which the crime was commit-
ted was operated in that peculiar or distinctive manner).
(2) Pittman owned the distillery at which the killing occurred.
(3) Pittman was present at the distillery when the killing oc-
curred.
(4) Pittman killed the deceased.
This chain seems to be a sound one, unless one would con-
sider that Pittman's manner of designing his distilleries was an
element of his character.
4. State v. Thomas2
The defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted of rape. At
the trial, the State offered the testimony of the prosecutrix that
the defendant entered her house and bedroom after midnight.
She testified that when she heard him, she exclaimed, "Who in
the world is this in my house at this time of night?", and the
defendant answered, "It's me, and I have come to kill you. I have
planned it every single day since you put me on the chaingang
for stealing your watch. 28 The trial court admitted this testi-
mony over the defendant's objection. On appeal, the supreme
court held this evidence was properly admitted because it
"tended directly and fairly to prove not only the identity of the
appellant, but his motive as well." 27
The inference chain connecting this evidence with the crime
for which the defendant was on trial seems to be:
(1) The victim was instrumental in having the defendant pro-
secuted and convicted in the past for stealing the victim's
watch.
(2) The defendant wanted to get even with the victim for that
act.
(3) The defendant committed a crime of violence against the
victim.
25. 248 S.C. 573, 151 S.E.2d 855 (1966).
26. Id. at 576, 151 S.E.2d at 857.
27. Id. at 583, 151 S.E.2d at 861.
[Vol. 28
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This inference chain appears to pass both the character test
and the clear perception test, unless link (2) is a character link.
As State v. Pittman indicates, however, holding a grudge against
one or a small number of persons is not generally considered a
trait of character.
2 8
There is also at least one other possible chain of inferences
establishing the relevance of the defendant's past crime:
(1) The defendant made the statement about the victim's hav-
ing put him on the chaingang for stealing her watch. (And the
victim did in fact do that.)
(2) The defendant was the man who entered the victim's home
and committed the rape.
This inference chain does not involve the character of the defen-
dant. In addition, it passes the clear perception test without any
difficulty, although the evidence of the defendant's presence on
the chaingang for stealing the watch must also be admitted in
order for the connection between links (1) and (2) to be manifest.
5. State v. Thompson 
9
The defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted on four
counts of violating liquor laws. The four counts included (1) hav-
ing in his possession unstamped liquor, (2) unlawful storing and
keeping of liquor, (3) selling liquor without a license, and (4)
having possession of liquor for an unlawful use. The State charged
that these offenses had taken place on March 18, 1956. At the
trial, the State offered as part of its case a police officer's testi-
mony that on October 17, 1955, he went to the premises of the
defendant with a search warrant and there found illegal corn
whiskey. The same police officer also offered evidence of a similar
incident that allegedly occurred in 1953. The defendant objected
to both of these items of evidence, and the trial court admitted
the evidence of the October 1955 search but excluded evidence of
the 1953 episode, finding it to be too remote in time. Later in the
trial, while the defendant was testifying in her own defense, she
stated on cross-examination that the police "had a spite against
her, that they 'picked on' her, and that on a majority of their
visits to her home they found no liquor."" After she so testified
28. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
29. 230 S.C. 473, 96 S.E.2d 471 (1957).
30. Id. at 475, 96 S.E.2d at 472.
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the State was permitted, over the defendant's objection, to intro-
duce evidence of the 1953 incident for the purpose of "find[ing]
out why they were picking on her."' 3' On appeal the Supreme
Court of South Carolina held that evidence of the October 1955
search was properly admitted because it tends "to show continu-
ity or habit, '3 but that evidence of the 1953 incident was impro-
perly admitted because it was "remote in time," "does not fall
within any of [the Lyle] exceptions," and involves an "alto-
gether collateral issue.
'33
The chain of inferences that establishes relevance here could
be:
(1) In October 1955 the defendant was illegally storing whiskey
at her home.
(2) Defendant is by character a violater of liquor laws.
(3) Defendant committed the crimes charged, all of which are
liquor law violations.
This inference chain may not be used because obviously link
(2) is a character link. This was apparently recognized by the
court, which relied upon a different chain:
(1) In October 1955 the defendant was illegally storing whiskey
at her home.
(2) The likelihood that whiskey was illegally stored at the de-
fendant's home in March 1956 is greater where such a condition
existed in October 1955 than where nothing is known about
conditions in October 1955.
(3) The defendant was illegally storing whiskey at her home in
March 1956.11
Does link (2) partake of the nature of a character link? There
is a generally accepted principle of relevance that the prior exist-
ence of a condition is evidence of the existence of that condition
at a later time."5 However, this principle is usually applied to the
existence or condition of inanimate objects. In this case the
continuation of the condition depends upon the action or failure
to act of a person, which in turn depends, to some extent at least,
31. Id. at 476, 96 S.E.2d at 472.
32. Id. at 475, 96 S.E.2d at 472.
33. Id. at 477, 96 S.E.2d at 472-73.
34. Id. at 475, 96 S.E.2d at 472.
35. 2 J. WmMOIi, EVIDENCF § 437 (3d ed. Supp. 1975); see, e.g., Nimmer v. North-
western R.R., 116 S.C. 190, 107 S.E. 479 (1921).
36. See note 35 supra.
[Vol. 28
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on the inclination or character of that person. It, therefore, seems
that link (2) of this inference chain is in reality a statement that
since the defendant illegally stored whiskey in October 1955, she
is a person proven to store illegal whiskey in her home, thereby
making it more likely that she illegally stored whiskey in March
1956 than would be if nothing was known about her prior acts.
This inference chain, so analyzed, contains a character link and
therefore should not be used.
On the question of whether to admit the evidence derived
from the 1953 search of defendant's premises, the court noted
that "the evidence of the 1953 offense was not admitted to prove
any of the crimes charged, but on the altogether collateral issue
of whether the officers had a spite against the defendant. ' '37 This
statement, although ambiguous, seemed to indicate that this evi-
dence failed to meet the clear perception test laid down in Lyle.
The court then properly ordered a new trial for the defendant,
because the admission of this evidence "had the effect of depriv-
ing her of her right to be tried only for the crimes set forth in the
indictment." 8
6. State v. Anderson
39
The defendant was on trial for murdering his wife of 10
weeks. The State offered evidence showing the circumstances of
the woman's death from which it could be inferred that defendant
had killed her. The State also offered evidence showing that some
six months before Mrs. Anderson's death, the defendant had pur-
chased a $50,000 life insurance policy on his then fiancee, making
her parents the beneficiaries, but that immediately following the
marriage the policy was amended to make the defendant the sole
beneficiary. This evidence was admitted. The State then offerd
evidence to show that less than one year before he had married
the victim, he had discussed marriage with each of two other
women successively, that he had made to them false representa-
tions as to his financial standing and education, and that he had
applied for $50,000 life insurance policies on each of them. In
addition, it was shown that the defendant had discussed marriage
and life insurance with a fourth woman, after his marriage to the
deceased but prior to her death. The offered evidence showed that
.37. 230 S.C. at 477, 96 S.E.2d at 473.
38. Id.
39. 253 S.C. 168, 169 S.E.2d 706, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 948 (1969).
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the policies on these women were not issued, in one case because
the woman proved to be uninsurable and in the other case be-
cause the defendant was unable to pay the initial premiums. This
evidence was objected to by the defendant on the grounds it was
irrelevant and unfairly prejudiced his defense by showing him to
be a liar and a promiscuous person. The evidence was admitted
over the defendant's objection. On appeal, the supreme court
affirmed the trial court's ruling on the ground that this evidence
was admissible under the Lyle exception, as it "tended to prove
circumstantially his overall plan"4 "to find a young girl, insure
her life for a large sum of money, marry her, murder her, and
collect the insurance proceeds."
'41
The inference chain approved by the court seems to be:
(la) In early 1964 the defendant made false representations
about his personal background and his financial standing to a
woman with whom he discussed marriage, and he sought a large
life insurance policy on her life, but she turned out to be unin-
surable.
(1b) In the summer of 1964 the defendant discussed marriage
with a second woman and sought a large life insurance policy
on her life, but the policy was never issued because the defen-
dant declared to the agent that he was unable to pay the initial
premium.
(1c) In December 1964, the defendant secured a $50,000 life
insurance policy on his then fiancee, whom he married in April
1965, and for whose murder in June 1965 he is on trial.
(1d) After the marriage, but before the death of his wife, the
defendant discussed marriage and life insurance with a fourth
woman.
(2) Defendant had in his mind an overall plan to purchase a
life insurance policy on a woman, marry her, kill her, and collect
the insurance money.
(3) Defendant killed his wife in execution of his plan.
Is link (2) an inference that may properly be drawn from
links (la), (1b), (1c) and (1d) taken together? In order to answer
this question we must consider two preliminary questions: Is link
(2) a forbidden character link? If it is not, can we "clearly per-
ceive" the connection between link (1) and link (2)?
What inferences can one reasonably draw from the fact that
40. Id. at 177, 169 S.E.2d at 710.
41. Id. at 174, 169 S.E.2d at 708.
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within the period of 12 months the defendant discussed marriage
with four different women in the circumstances set out above?
These possible inferences come to mind:
(1) Defendant is promiscuous. This is a character inference
and is therefore not permissible.
(2) From fact (1d) above it can be inferred that defendant was
planning to dispose of his wife in some fashion, as he was dis-
cussing marriage with another woman. There is no character
inference involved here, and also one may clearly perceive the
connection between the proven fact and the crime charged.
(3) From fact (1c) above, it may be inferred that the defendant
killed his wife, as it is generally recognized that in a murder trial
evidence is admissible that tends to show that the defendant
had, prior to the death of the deceased, made arrangements that
would cause the death to inure to his financial benefit'
2
(4) Facts (la) through (1d), a series of attempts, one of which
was successful, to purchase life insurance on a prospective wife,
show that the defendant engaged in similar conduct on four
different occasions in a relatively short period of time.
The fourth episode, (1d), discussed above as the second infer-
ence, provides a basis upon which one may infer what was in-
tended by defendant in the transaction involving the woman that
he married. And from defendant's intent it may be inferred that
he committed the crime. The third episode, (1c), standing alone,
is admissible as set out in the preceding paragraph. But do the
first two episodes, (la) and (lb), provide a basis for any reason-
able inference of defendant's guilt? At most the first two episodes
show that the defendant had it in his mind that he would find a
woman to marry and would purchase a large insurance policy on
her life. The fact that he had such a plan would of course provide
a basis for an inference that he carried out that plan, that is, the
plan to buy life insurance on a woman and then marry her. How-
ever, that evidence is cumulative and therefore unnecessary
where there is direct evidence, as there was in this case, that the
defendant bought life insurance on the deceased and subse-
quently married her. Where such evidence provides a basis upon
which a jury might draw an unfavorable inference about his char-
acter, as it does here, and the evidence is cumulative, the unfair
prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value,
42. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 390 (3d ed. Supp. 1975).
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and it should be excluded, particularly where the evidence in
question is merely circumstantial.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina found in this entire
pattern of conduct, plus other facts, evidence of an "intelligently
conceived design ...to find a young girl, insure her life for a
large sum of money, marry her, murder her, and collect the insur-
ance proceeds." 3 While it is true that facts (1c) and (1d) are
relevant to the issue of whether or not the defendant killed the
deceased, facts (la) and (ib) are clearly not relevant to that issue,
as it could not be said that one who buys life insurance on Miss
A is more likely to have killed Miss B than is one about whom
nothing is known. It is therefore submitted that the court should
not have admitted facts (la) and (ib) when they were objected
to by the defendant on grounds of unfair prejudice.
Conclusion
The sum and substance of the above discussion is that, in
determining whether or not to admit evidence of other crimes or
bad acts, a court should trace the inference chain which suppos-
edly connects the evidence with the issues in the case, looking for
these flaws in the chain:
(1) Is there a character link in the inference chain? If the an-
swer to this question is "yes", the chain breaks and the evidence
must be excluded, unless another chain that does not contain
such a link can be built.
(2) Does the court "clearly perceive" the connection of each
link with the link that immediately precedes it in the chain? If
the answer to this question is "no", the inference chain breaks
between the two links and cannot be used.
(3) Does the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweigh the
probative value? If the court answers "yes" to this question, the
evidence may not be used.
Whenever evidence of a crime or bad act is introduced there
is a likelihood that the jury will build a character link onto the
link that is made up of the offered evidence. Under the rule stated
in (1) above, the chain must end with the character link, as the
character link will not support the addition of another link lead-
ing in the direction of the issues in the case. The court should
43. 253 S.C. at 174, 169 S.E.2d at 708.
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then consider whether another chain can be built between the
evidence offered and one of the issues in the case which is not
dependent upon the character link. After that chain is con-
structed, the court should apply the clear perception test to each
link, and, as it applies that test, the court must at the same time
measure the clarity of perception against the likelihood that the
jury may draw the forbidden character inference chain. Or stated
another way, the court should exclude the evidence if its proba-
tive value is outweighed by the risk that its admission will create
a substantial danger of undue prejudice to the accused."
44. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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